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Abstract - The advent of internationalized domain names
(IDNs) has introduced a new threat, with the non-English
character sets allowing for visual mimicry of domain names.
Whilst this potential for this form of attack has been well
recognized, many applications such as Internet browsers and
e-mail clients have been slow to adopt successful mitigation
strategies and countermeasures. This research examines those
strategies and countermeasures, identifying areas of weakness
that allow for homograph attacks. As well as examining the
presentation of IDNs in e-mail clients and Internet browser
URL bars, this year’s study examines the presentation of IDNs
in browser-based security certificates and requests for
locational data access.
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Introduction

Internationalized Domain Names (IDN) allow for nonlatin characters to be present in domain names. There are a
number of security issues associated with this. Primarily this
comes from the potential impersonation of domains by an
attacker. This attack is achieved through the use of non-latin
characters, which are visually indistinguishable from their
latin counterparts. The aforementioned attack is known as an
IDN homograph attack. This paper aims to investigate the
strategies utilized by current web browsers to mitigate the
impact of these attacks.

1.1

Instructions for authors

Domain names have been with us for a long time, first
introduced in 1983 they provided a centralized means of
abstraction for IP addresses (Mockapetris 1983, Mockapetris
1983). Since their inception domain names have become a
key player in the information security arena, a known domain
name inspires trust on behalf of the average user and as such
is a high value item for would be attackers. Internationalized
Domain Name Homograph attacks represent one attack vector
that such an attacker could leverage for his/her advantage.
The initial implementation of domain names allowed only for
alphanumeric characters and hyphens encoded as ASCII
(Mockapetris 1983). In subsequent years it become apparent
that this was an unacceptable limitation as audiences that
make use of non-latin character sets were not able to have

domains in their respective languages. In 1998 the initial
work on Internationalized Domain Names (IDN) began. This
work and subsequent work cumulated in 2003 with the
publication of RFC3454, RFC3490, RFC3491 and RFC3492,
a set of documents outlining the function and proposed
implementation of IDN (Bell-ATL 2011).
The proposed IDN solution made use of UTF-8 character
encoding to allow for non-latin characters to be displayed. In
order to enable existing DNS infrastructure to handle UTF-8
domains a system known as Punycode was developed
(Faltstrom, Hoffman et al. 2003). Punycode provides facility
to represent IDNs as regular ASCII domain names, as such no
changes are required for the majority of infrastructure
(Costello 2003). An example of an IDN would be the domain
name ☃.com, which would be represented as xn--n3h.com
when converted to punycode.

1.2

Attacks

A number of visually indistinguishable glyhps (known
as homoglyphs) exist within the Unicode character space. An
example pair of glyphs are Unicode 0067 “Latin Small Letter
G” and its counterpart Unicode 0261 “Latin Small Letter
Script G” which are visually indistinguishable from one
another. The aforementioned glyphs can be seen below in
Figure 1.

ɡ

g

U+0047
Latin Small Letter G

U+0261
Latin Small Letter Script G

Figure 1 – Example of Homoglyph for “g”
Homoglyphs can be combined with characters from other
scripts to form a series of glyphs, which as a whole are
visually indistinguishable from their English counterpart.
When a client or server interprets these homographs however
they are treated in a distinct manner. Through the use of this
trait attackers are able to craft domain names, which look
familiar but are hostile in intent. These attacks can be
deployed in the same manner as regular email phishing
attacks, aiming to entice a user into accessing a hostile
website in the belief that it is the genuine site being imitated.
These attacks have been employed to steal financial data,
passwords and corporate information.

Traditionally phishing attacks are mitigated through user
education, encouraging users to check the legitimacy of links
before clicking them, looking for unrelated URLs, not
replying to emails asking for information if they are from an
external domain name, etc. However when phishing
campaigns are modified to make use of homograph domain
names the ability for user education to provide mitigate is
eliminated, as there is no way to make a visual identification
of a fraudulent domain name. Figure 2 shows two domain
names, both visually identical, however they lead to separate
websites, with the one to the right making use of U+0261
rather than U+0047 for the second G.

ɡoogle.com

gooɡle.com

Figure 2 – A pair of Homograph Domains

1.3

Mitigation

A number of countermeasures have been implemented in
order to mitigate the effectiveness of this attack. The majority
of these involve displaying punycode in place of the actual
UTF-8 text. Punycode is an ASCII representation of a
Unicode domain name, originally implemented as the domain
name service infrastructure did not support Unicode (Costello
2003). The punycode alternative is commonly displayed in
both the address bar and the status bar on hover for a
particular link.
When identifying domain names to display in punycode, there
are two main methods used. The first (used by internet
explorer 7 and above) is to use punycode only when a domain
using mixed-script is detected (Fu, Deng et al. 2006). The
implications of this are that any domain, which is intended to
be spoofed via the replacement of one or more characters,
will be detected, however in the event that the entire domain
name is made from a single script it will be presented as
intended by the attacker.
The other method employed by Mozilla Firefox and Safari
both utilizes a whitelist in which all IDNs are presented as
punycode unless they belong to a top level domain (TLD) that
has policy in place preventing the spoofing of domain names
in this manner. The policies employed via TLDs to prevent
this attack often require that prior to registering a domain
name containing homoglyphs, the registerer must own the
domain name containing the western variant of those
homoglyphs. In implementing this policy the IDN homograph
attack is eliminated, however a number of TLDs have failed
to implement this policy (Mozilla 2005).

A final strategy involves the color coding of various scripts in
URLs (Krammer 2006). In this method Cryllic scripts are
highlighted one color, while western scripts are left
uncolored. In this situation mixed script URLs become
immediately visible to the user, even though the characters
themselves are visibly identical.
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Testing strategy

For testing purposes we developed a virtual environment
comprised of Windows 7 installation, which at the time of
writing at all current updates applied. A snapshot was taken
prior to the installation of web browsers or email clients.
Four primary attack vectors were identified with regards to
IDN homograph attacks in web browsers, corresponding to
the four most prominent locations in which an IDN may be
shown to the user. If an IDN is shown in Unicode, a
homograph attack could result in the user being tricked into
believing that a URL is that of a legitimate website. The four
attack vectors, in order of prevalence, are:


The text shown in the browser’s address bar, after the
“Go” (or equivalent) button has been pressed.



The text shown in the browser’s status bar while the
mouse is over a hyperlink.



The text shown when viewing prominent information
about a website’s SSL certificate. As most users do not
examine the details of a certificate, this attack vector
relies upon the presentation of IDNs in immediately
visible or accessible information.



The text shown when the user is prompted to share their
location using geolocation services.

In order to summarize the findings, an overall “Mitigation
Rating” was calculated for each version of each browser
tested. A value of zero is awarded if the browser does not
support a particular attack vector, for example a lack of
support for IDNs or geolocation services. A value of negative
one is awarded if the browser supports an attack vector
without mitigation against IDN homograph attacks. A value
of positive one is awarded if the browser supports an attack
vector and does mitigate against IDN homograph attacks, for
example by presenting IDNs in Punycode.
As the
presentation of IDNs in the browser’s address bar is by far the
most prominent and influential vector of attack, values of
positive and negative two are awarded for this vector. These
values are shown in Figure 3 below.

Address Bar
-2 (Unmitigated)

Status Bar
-1 (Unmitigated)

SSL Certificate
-1 (Unmitigated)

Location Request
-1 (Unmitigated)

0 (No Support)

0 (No Support)

0 (No Support)

0 (No Support)

+2 (Mitigated)

+1 (Mitigated)

+1 (Mitigated)

+1 (Mitigated)

Figure 3 – Mitigation Ratings
By applying this metric, each browser version tested can be
awarded a Mitigation Rating between positive five and
negative five, representing a browser that supports and
mitigates all attack vectors and a browser that supports but
does not mitigate any of the attack vectors respectively.
Numerous versions of five web browsers were tested, based
on averaged current market share data from a number of
sources (Clicky 2011). Tested browsers were Internet
Explorer (Microsoft), Firefox (Mozilla), Chrome (Google),
Opera (Opera Software) and Safari (Apple). The authors
attempted to test the initial release of each major version of
the browsers since 2003, when RFC3454, RFC3490,
RFC3491 and RFC3492 and ICANN’s “Guidelines for the
Implementation of Internationalized Domain Names” were
published. All browsers were tested in a Windows 7
environment. The results of the testing are presented below.
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Results

Firefox
Version & Address Bar
Release Date Mitigation

Status Bar
Mitigation

Status Bar
Mitigation

SSL Certificate
Mitigation

Mitigation
Rating

None

None

None

No support

-4

1.5 (2005-11)

Punycode

Punycode

None

No support

+2

2.0 (2006-10)

Punycode

Punycode

None

No support

+2

3.0 (2008-06)

Punycode

Punycode

Punycode

No support

+4

3.5 (2009-06)

Punycode

Punycode

Punycode

Punycode

+5

3.6 (2010-01)

Punycode

Punycode

Punycode

Punycode

+5

4.0 (2011-03)

Punycode

Punycode

Punycode

Punycode

+5

5.0 (2011-06)

Punycode

Punycode

Punycode

Punycode

+5

6.0 (2011-08)

Punycode

Punycode

Punycode

Punycode

+5

7.0 (2011-09)

Punycode

Punycode

Punycode

Punycode

+5

Figure 5 – Results for Firefox
The first version of Mozilla Firefox was released in late 2004,
and supported IDNs without any features to mitigate against
homograph attacks.
From version 1.5, released
approximately a year later, IDNs in the address and status
bars were shown in Punycode. From version 3.0, released in
mid 2008, IDNs were shown in Punycode for SSL certificate
information and were also placed more prominently in the
interface.
When support for geolocation services was
implemented in version 3.5, mid 2009, requests were shown
in Punycode. Firefox incorporated features that mitigate IDN
homograph attacks fairly quickly, limiting its exposure in the
two main vectors to a single major release.
Google Chrome

Location Request
Mitigation

Mitigation
Rating

7.0 (2006-10) Punycode

Punycode

No Mitigation

No Support

+2

8.0 (2009-03) Punycode

Punycode

No Mitigation

No Support

+2

9.0.8
03)

Punycode

No Mitigation

No Mitigation

+1

(2011- Punycode

Location Request
Mitigation

1.0 (2004-11)

Internet Explorer
Version & Address Bar
Release Date Mitigation

SSL Certificate
Mitigation

Figure 4 – Results for Internet Explorer
Support for IDNs was added to Microsoft Internet Explorer in
version 7, released in late 2006. IDNs in the address and
status bars were shown in Punycode, and an icon providing
further information about IDNs appears next to the address
bar when one is used. Support for geolocation services was
implemented in the latest major version of the browser,
version 9, released in March of 2011. Internet Explorer
currently offers no mitigation against IDNs in SSL certificate
information or geolocation requests, showing them in
Unicode. While Internet Explorer has protected itself against
the most significant vector of IDN homograph attacks since
support for IDNs was implemented, SSL certificate
information and geolocation requests are presented without
any mitigating features.

Version &
Release Date

Address
Bar
Mitigation

Status Bar
Mitigation

SSL
Certificate
Mitigation

Location
Request
Mitigation

Mitigation
Rating

1.0.154.59 (2009-04)

Punycode

Punycode

Punycode

No support

+4

2.0.172.27 (2009-05)

Punycode

Punycode

Punycode

Punycode

+5

3.0.197.11 (2009-08)

Punycode

Punycode

Punycode

Punycode

+5

4.0.302.3 (2010-01)

Punycode

Punycode

Punycode

Punycode

+5

5.0.396.0 (2010-05)

Punycode

Punycode

Punycode

Punycode

+5

6.0.495.0 (2010-08)

Punycode

Punycode

Punycode

Punycode

+5

7.0.544.0 (2010-10)

Punycode

Punycode

Punycode

Punycode

+5

8.0.552.224 (2010-12)

Punycode

Punycode

Punycode

Punycode

+5

9.0.597.16 (2011-02)

Punycode

Punycode

Punycode

Punycode

+5

10.0.648.205 (2011-03) Punycode

Punycode

Punycode

Punycode

+5

11.0.696.77 (2011-04)

Punycode

Punycode

Punycode

Punycode

+5

12.0.742.112 (2011-06) Punycode

Punycode

Punycode

Punycode

+5

13.0.782.218 (2011-08) Punycode

Punycode

Punycode

Punycode

+5

14.0.835.202 (2011-09) Punycode

Punycode

Punycode

Punycode

+5

15.0.874.21 (2011-09)

Punycode

Punycode

Punycode

Punycode

+5

16.0.904.0 (2011-10)

Punycode

Punycode

Punycode

Punycode

+5

Figure 6 – Results for Google Chrome
Despite only being released a few years ago, Google has
released sixteen versions of the Chrome web browser. As the
browser is in beta, the release cycle and version numbers are
not as predictable as other browsers. All versions present
IDNs in the address bar, status bar, SSL certificate

information and geolocation requests in Punycode. Support
for geolocation services was added in version 2 of the
browser, released in mid 2009. All versions of Chrome have
included defences against IDN homograph attacks, however
the fact that it was first released much later than any of the
other major browsers must be taken into account.
Opera
Version &
Release Date

Address Bar
Mitigation

7.00 (2003-01) No support

Status Bar
Mitigation
No support

SSL Certificate
Mitigation

Location Request
Mitigation

Mitigation
Rating

No support

No Support

0

8.00 (2005-04) No Mitigation No
Mitigation

No Mitigation

No Support

-4

9.00 (2006-06) No Mitigation No
Mitigation

No Mitigation

No Support

-4

10.00
09)

(2009- No Mitigation No
Mitigation

No Mitigation

No Support

-4

11.00
12)

(2010- Punycode

Punycode

Punycode

Punycode

+5

11.51
08)

(2011- Punycode

Punycode

Punycode

Punycode

+5

Figure 7 – Results for Opera
Version 7 of the Opera web browser, released early in 2003,
did not support IDNs. The next three major releases (in 2005,
2006 and 2009) supported IDNs but offered no mitigation to
IDN homograph attacks. Support for geolocation services
was added in version 11, late 2010, at which point IDNs in all
attack vectors started to be shown in Punycode. While all
vectors are not mitigated against IDN homograph attacks, the
browser was vulnerable to the attacks for approximately five
years.
Safari
Version &
Release Date

Address Bar
Mitigation

Status Bar
Mitigation

SSL Certificate
Mitigation

Location Request
Mitigation

Mitigation
Rating

3.1 (2008-03)

No Mitigation No
Mitigation

No Mitigation

No Support

-4

3.2 (2008-11)

No Mitigation No
Mitigation

No Mitigation

No Support

-4

4.0 (2009-06)

No Mitigation No
Mitigation

No Mitigation

No Support

-4

5.0.1 (2010-07) Punycode

Punycode

No Mitigation

Punycode

+3

5.1 (2011-07)

Punycode

No Mitigation

Punycode

+3

Punycode

Figure 8 – Results for Safari
Apple’s Safari browser began showing IDNs in Punycode in
the address bar, status bar and geolocation requests from
version 5, released in mid 2010. Prior to that version, IDNs
in the address and status bar were shown in Unicode and
geolocation services were unsupported. It is worthwhile
noting that the default settings for Safari hide the status bar,
nullifying the mitigation possible when hovering over a
hyperlink.
No mitigation exists for SSL certificate
information. The authors also noted that the first HTTP URL
to be entered into the address bar upon launching the latest
version of the browser was shown in Unicode. Successive
URLs were presented in Punycode. Safari was vulnerable to
IDN homograph attacks for a number of years, and remains
vulnerable in small areas.
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Figure 9 – Results Summary

Conclusion

The longitudinal data present from the nine years of software
releases sampled provides interesting data. We can see that
there is a strong trend towards effectively mitigating IDN
homograph attacks in all products tested. However there still
exists a need to ensure that location services and other
potential areas of web browsers are secured in the same
manner as the rest of the URL parsers & display mechanisms
in the software. The lack of mitigation in some areas but not
others in the same browsers suggests significant duplication
of functionality in code, which is resulting in an increased
attack surface. In order to better mitigate this issue it would
be advantageous to consolidate these functions into single
libraries which perform URL parsing, display and IDN
homograph attack mitigation.
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